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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Current Political Context Surrounding Genetically
Modified Organisms and Genetically Modified Foods
Genetically modified organisms (GMO) and genetically
modified foods (GMF) are a topic much in the news of late. They
arouse strong passions on the political front, and have proven a
focus of passionate resistance by opponents and equally pas-
sionate support by those in favor. There have been violent pro-
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tests against GMO and GMF at meetings of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) in Seattle in 1999, at the International
Monetary Fund meeting in Washington D.C. in 2000, and again
at the World Bank meeting in Genoa in the summer of 2001.1
Consumer organizations and non-governmental organiza-
tions in many countries are seeking either an outright ban on
GMO and GMF or, at the least, much stricter regulation. 2 There
is a widespread movement in many countries aimed at destroy-
ing GMO crops. 3 Opponents cite concern for the long-term
health effects of such products, and claim that the products are
not adequately tested by independent scientists. 4 They are also
concerned about destruction of bio-diversity, both of native
plant species, and of animals and insects that feed on such
crops. 5 Another concern frequently expressed is the lack of
transparency of testing and regulation of such products.6 The
movement is also motivated by antipathy to large multi-na-
tional corporations and their perceived growing control over ag-
riculture and food.7 Concern for small farmers and moral
reservations about manipulation of living things also play a
role.8
1 See Dorothy Nelkin et al., The International Challenge of Genetically Modi-
fied Organism Regulation, 8 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 523, 524 (2000).
2 One example is Brazil. See, e.g., Reese Ewing, Analysis: Brazil GMO Ban
Seen in Place Till at Least 2003, REUTERS NEWs, Feb. 5, 2002, available at http:ll
www.planetark.org/dailynewsstory.cfm/newsid/14369/story.htm.
3 See, e.g., Farmers Advised to Destroy GM Crops, BBC NEWS ONLINE, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk-politics/766539.stm (May 27, 2000) (UK government
advising farmers who accidentally planted GM crops to destroy them or dispose of
them after they have been harvested).
4 See generally Consumers Choice Council for articles, papers, and press re-
leases on Genetically Engineered Food, at www.consumerscouncil.org (last modi-
fied Sept. 3, 2003); see also Public Citizen for more articles on GMO (search entire
site using as a keyword "GMO"), at www.citizen.org (last visited Sept. 29, 2003).
5 See Consumers Choice Council, supra note 4; see also John E. Losey et al.,
Transgenic Pollen Harms Monarch Larvae, 399 NATURE 214 (1999) (cited by many,
including Brett Grosko, Note, Genetic Engineering and International Law: Conflict
or Harmony? An Analysis of the Biosafety Protocol, GATT, and the WTO Sanitary
and Phytosanitary Agreement, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 295, 302 n.39 (2001)).
6 See Grosko, supra note 5, at 318.
7 See generally Consumers Choice Council, supra note 4; George E.C. York,
Note, Global Foods, Local Tastes and Biotechnology: The New Legal Architecture of
International Agriculture Trade, 7 COLUM. J. EUR. L 423, 432-33 (2001); Sean D.
Murphy, Biotechnology and International Law, 42 HARV. INT'L L.J. 47, 65 (2001).
8 See Nelkin et al., supra note 1, at 528.
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Proponents of GMO and GMF present substantial argu-
ments indicating that GMO are safe.9 Proponents also claim
huge potential benefits for the world's poor and underdeveloped
countries. 10 GMO can be created, which requires less water, or
grown in nutrient-poor soil." GMO can be made to be pest-re-
sistant, thus requiring fewer pesticides and herbicides than
traditional varieties, while producing much larger yields. 12
GMO can also be created with heightened nutritional content,
which proponents claim is a further benefit for the world's hun-
gry and malnourished. 13
B. Distinction Between Genetically Modified Organisms and
Genetically Modified Foods
This paper distinguishes between GMO and GMF, as they
involve different issues, different risks and often different regu-
lations. GMO, in this context, refers to seeds and other agricul-
tural products, grown as such. They are living organisms
created through genetic engineering. 14 Scientists transplant the
genes of one species into another to transfer desirable charac-
teristics. 15 GMF is food made from GMO.16 GMF may be a liv-
ing organism, such as a tomato or potato, or a food product
made from GMO ingredients.
Issues arising in the context of GMO include the potential
spread of GMO into either organically grown or traditional vari-
eties of crops.' 7 This brings with it the danger of cross-pollina-
tion and the potential elimination of traditional and organic
varieties, threatening bio-diversity.18 There is also a danger of
cross-pollination with weeds, creating "super-weeds," which are
resistant to herbicides and pesticides to the same extent as the
9 Id. at 526.
10 See York, supra note 7, at 431.
11 Id.
12 See Murphy, supra note 7, at 55-56; York, supra note 7, at 429-31.
13 See Murphy, supra note 7, at 55-56; York, supra note 7, at 429-31.
14 See Nelkin et al., supra note 1, at 523 ("GMO products [are defined as] the
crops and other organisms that have been genetically modified by use of recombi-
nant DNA technologies and food and other products containing such organisms").
15 See Murphy, supra note 7, at 50.
16 See York, supra note 7, at 430.
17 See York, supra note 7, at 433.
18 Id.
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GMO. 19 Some GMO have been found to destroy beneficial fun-
gus in the soil surrounding them.20 While related to GMF, the
range of issues and concerns about GMO, and their potential
regulation, are not the focus of this paper.
GMF are foods derived from GMO. 21 GMF includes grains
and other products such as corn (maize), wheat, rice, soybeans,
sugar beets and rapeseed. 22 The grains can be used as animal
feed or processed into food, e.g., oil, tofu, bean curd or other
products eaten by humans. GMF also include produce eaten di-
rectly. GMF produce includes tomatoes, squash, potatoes,
radicchio, and melon.23 They have been modified for longer
shelf life, slower ripening, resistance to freezing, resistance to
pests and the like. 24
Proponents of GMF claim that they are not proven to cause
any ill effects to humans or animals. Increased yields, better
field-to-market durability, better resistance to pests and im-
proved appearance are benefits of GMF. 25 They cite particular
benefits for developing countries, which need to feed their hun-
gry and often lack the technology that makes possible the pro-
ductivity achieved by the developed world.
26
Opponents of GMF cite concerns which include those men-
tioned by opponents of GMO. Other concerns are more directly
related to human consumption of such products.2 7 Foremost is
19 See, e.g., Thomas Hayden, Bad Seeds in Court, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD RE-
PORT, Feb. 4, 2002 (concerning a lawsuit by an organic farmer whose crops were
contaminated by GM canola); Ivan Noble, Mexican Study Raises GM Concern, BBC
NEWS ONLINE, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/low/science/nature/1680848.stm (Nov. 28,
2001) (concerning the contamination of Mexican wild maize by GM plant vari-
eties); Murphy, supra note 7, at 58; see also Consumers Choice Council, supra note
4.
20 See Murphy, supra note 7, at 90.
21 See York, supra note 7, at 430.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 429.
24 See, e.g., Andrew J. Nicholas, Comment, As the Organic Food Industry Gets
Its House in Order, the Time Has Come for National Standards for Genetically
Modified Foods, 15 Loy. CONSUMER L. REV. 277, 280 (2003); Steven H. Yoshida,
The Safety of Genetically Modified Soybeans: Evidence and Regulation, 55 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 193, 193 (2000); York, supra note 7, at 429.
25 See Murphy, supra note 7, at 55-56.
26 See York, supra note 7, at 431.
27 See Murphy, supra note 7, at 57; for an in-depth discussion of the concerns
surrounding GMOs, see OECD Report of the Task Force for the Safety of Novel
Foods and Feeds, C(2000)86/ADD1 (May 31, 2000), at http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/
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allergenicity, as when a gene from a product to which many peo-
ple are allergic is inserted into another species. 28 Another con-
cern is toxicity, especially where the product has a heightened
vitamin content and the food is a staple of an area's diet.29 Cre-
ation of antibiotic resistance by consumption of antibiotic resis-
tant food is yet another issue raised.30 While some scientists
agree that "first generation" GMF might be considered safe, the
"new generation GMF," which may include multiple gene ma-
nipulations and is therefore more complex, poses potentially
graver risks.31 Aside from general health-related concerns, op-
ponents of GMF also resist them on grounds of moral or ethical
scruples, and on the basis of the consumer's right to know what
they are eating.32
Against this highly politically charged atmosphere, mul-
tinational fora and national governments have begun to take
steps to regulate and, in some cases, ban GMF.
C. Recent History of Regulation of Genetically Modified
Foods
The recent approach to regulation of GMF can be character-
ized as predominantly unilateral, with a fragmented interna-
tional approach. 33 One reason for this is the speed with which
the technology has been developed and commercialized.34 The
past ten years have seen a boom in the bio-technology industry
and in the marketing of GMO and GMF. 35 International fora
2000doc.nsf/LinkTo/C(2000)86-ADD1 [hereinafter OECD Report]; and Gretchen L.
Gaston & Randall S. Abate, The Biosafety Protocol and the World Trade Organiza-
tion: Can the Two Coexist?, 12 PACE INT'L L. REV. 107, 118 (2000).
28 One example is Brazil nut genes in tomatoes. People allergic to nuts would
not normally look for danger in eating tomatoes. See generally OECD Report,
supra note 27, at 13.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 17.
31 Id. at 31.
32 Id at 17; see also Nelkin et al., supra note 1, at 527-28.
33 See Kim Brooks, History, Change and Policy: Factors Leading to Current
Opposition to Food Biotechnology; 5 GEO. PUB. POL'Y REV. 153, 158-59 (2000).
34 Id.
35 See generally id. (describing the rapid advance of chemical companies into
biotech seeds and food since 1992, with even more rapid expansion since 1997, and
the increasing market dominance of Monsanto, Novartis, DuPont and Dow in the
field).
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have not kept pace with these developments, nor, in many in-
stances, have the attitudes of consumers. 36
The United States has been foremost in adopting the sci-
ence, followed rapidly by other major grain-exporting countries,
such as Brazil, Argentina, and Canada. By 2001, fifty varieties
of genetically modified (GM) crops had been approved in the
United States. Millions of acres of cropland in the United States
are planted with GM crops. 37 Reports indicate the same for Bra-
zil.38 In such countries, there is a strong business and govern-
mental interest in promoting export of GM crops, with
corresponding liberal regulation of them.
Other countries have been slower and more reluctant to
adopt the new biotechnology for crops. This is driven in part by
consumer resistance,39 and also in part perhaps by a more cau-
tious attitude to novel foods. Regulation of GM foods is more
restrictive in these countries, with both planting of GMO and
use of GMF either banned or subject to significant restric-
tions.40 The European Union (EU) has imposed a complete ban
on the import of any GM products since 1998.41 Japan, New
Zealand, Australia, Switzerland, and the EU have all imple-
mented or begun regulation of GMF, mostly through labeling
schemes and an approval process for importation or commer-
cialization of GMO and GMF.42
36 Id.
37 See Murphy, supra note 7, at 55 (In the United States in 2000, 52% of ap-
proximately 75 million acres of soybeans, 56% of approximately 15.5 million acres
of cotton and 25% of approx. 78 million acres of corn are planted with GM crops).
38 See Richard Wright, Paper Slams GM-free Claim, FARMING NEWS, June 21,
2001, available at 2001 WL 10275849 (citing reports from a Brazilian newspaper
Valor that thousands of acres of genetically modified soya is illegally being grown
in Brazil, using seed imported illegally from Argentina. The State Seed Producers
and Dealers organization claimed that GM crops will make up 45% of total crops in
2001, "whether or not it is authorized." The attraction for Brazilian farmers is the
reduced cost of herbicides to grow GM crops); Raymond Colitt, Brazil Set to Re-
move Block on GM Soya, FINANCIAL TIMES (London) (Sept. 26, 2003), at LexisNexis
(noting that the Brazilian government is expected to announce the legalization of
genetically modified soybeans, which due to illegal planting already make up an
estimated 15% of Brazil's total soybean harvest, opening one of the world's last
GM-free agricultural frontiers).
39 See Nelkin et al., supra note 1, at 523-24.
40 See discussion infra Part II.
41 See Brooks, supra note 33, at 154.
42 See discussion infra Part II.
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D. Potential Trade Conflicts Involving Genetically Modified
Foods
International fora have begun to address the issues of GMF
only relatively recently. One result is that there are a number of
potential trade conflicts brewing. These will occur between ex-
porting and importing countries. Those countries which have
most aggressively adopted GMO and GMF find themselves in-
creasingly unable to export their products. 43 The largest and ar-
guably most important potential dispute, and the one on which
most commentary has centered, is between the United States
and the EU. Both the Clinton and the current Bush administra-
tion have pressured the EU to modify or drop its proposed label-
ing requirements for GMF, pressure which the Europeans have
staunchly resisted.44 To analyze the potential outcome of such
disputes, it is necessary to look at the current state of multilat-
eral and national GM regulation in more detail.
II. CURRENT STATE OF GMF REGULATION
A. Multilateral Approaches to and Discussions of Genetically
Modified Foods
There are four main fora which are involved in regulation
of GMF, or in studying the current state of the field. Some are
more directly concerned with GMO than GMF; however, all
have discussed regulation of GMF. These include the UN Codex
Alimentarius, the Cartagena Protocol to the Convention on Bio-
logical Diversity, the OECD Working Parties on Safety of Novel
Foods (OECD) and the WTO. Some potential regulations from
43 See, e.g., Corn Growers See Recent Events in Europe As Continuing the Con-
troversy Over GMO Use in the USA: On-Farm Segregation Is Likely Result of For-
eign Consumer Backlash, American Corn Growers Association, at http://
www.acga.org/news/2000/060100.htm (Jun. 1, 2000) (In marketing years 1998-
1999, corn exports from the United States to Europe stood at 2 million metric tons.
In 1998-1999, those exports dropped to 137,000 tons. Soybean sales showed a one-
year drop in the same time period from 11 million tons to 6 million tons); Justin
Sears, Argentina Accuses Europe of Protectionism in GM Debate: Commodities,
LLOYD'S LIST INT'L, Jun. 18, 1999 (The head of Argentina's export body claimed
that EU protectionism is behind its attempts to restrict import of GM soy, and
constitutes a non-tariff barrier to trade. Argentina has about 60% of its soybean
acreage planted with GM soy, and exported over 3.2 million tons of soy. Argentina
also uses GM corn seeds extensively).
44 See Alan Sipress & Marc Kaufman, US Challenges EU's Biotech Food Stan-
dard, THE WASHINGTON POST, Aug. 26, 2001, available at 2001 WL 23189504.
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these fora could have significance for any trade violations
claimed before the WTO. A brief overview of the relevant provi-
sions is provided below.
1. UN Codex Alimentarius
The Codex Alimentarius (Codex) is the United Nations
(UN) body which sets guidelines for food safety. 45 It currently
has working parties considering drafts on conducting risk as-
sessments for foods derived from technology, and on food label-
ing.46 As far as the Committee on Labeling of Foods Obtained
Through Biotechnology (Committee) is concerned, there is still
no consensus on the approach to take, and the drafts were re-
turned to the parties for further discussion and comments.
47
The Committee is discussing three options.
Option 1: Label only if the food differs significantly from corre-
sponding foods as to composition, nutritional value or intended
use (preferred by the United States, Argentina and others).
Option 2: Includes most of Option 1, with the addition that the
labels must disclose the method of production of bio-technology-
derived foods or ingredients.
Option 3: Label required if any genetically-modified material is
used at any time in the production process (proposed by Norway
and India).48
The OECD is currently attempting to combine preferred as-
pects of Options 1 and 2. According to the Committee's report,
there is still dispute over health concerns regarding GMF.
49
There is also strong concern for providing consumers with infor-
mation about the food they eat, regardless of whether the food is
45 See, e.g., Codex Alimentarius Commission, Report of Twenty-Eighth Ses-
sion of the Codex Committee on Food Labelling, ALINORM 01/22 (2000), at http:l/
www.fao.org/docrep/meeting/005/x731le/x73leOO.htm; [hereinafter Codex 28th
Sess. Report], and Report of Twenty-Ninth Session of the Codex Committee on
Food Labelling, ALINORM 01/22A (2001), at http://www.fao.org/docrep/meeting/005/
y0651e/y0651e00.htm [hereinafter Codex 29th Sess. Report].
46 See Codex 28th Sess. Report, supra note 45; Codex 29th Sess. Report, supra
note 45.
47 See Anne A. MacKenzie, The Process Of Developing Labeling Standards For
GM Foods In The Codex Alimentarius, 3 AGBIoFORUM 4, 203-208 (2000), at http://
www.agbioforum.org/v3n4/v3n4a04-mackenzie.htm.
48 See Codex 29th Sess. Report, supra note 45, app. 5, paras. 6-9.
49 Id. paras. 49-78.
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considered healthy.50 The guidelines to the OECD indicate that
the overall objective is to facilitate consumer choice. 51
One potential problem for future resolution of trade dis-
putes concerns the manner in which standards in the Codex are
adopted. Traditionally they have been by consensus, but as the
issues become more political, so does the decision-making pro-
cess. 52 One concern voiced is whether the rules on labeling will
be adopted by consensus, or by a majority vote.5 3 The approach
that Codex takes is significant for potential disputes under the
WTO, as there is a presumption of WTO consistency for mea-
sures taken in conformity with international standards, by
which Codex is meant.54
2. Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on
Biological Diversity
The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on
Biological Diversitys5 (Protocol) was adopted on January 29,
2000. The Protocol entered into force on September 11, 2003,
ninety days after being ratified by fifty countries, as required by
50 Id. app. 5, para. 2.
51 Id.
52 See James F. Smith, From Frankenfood to Fruit Flies: Navigating the
WTO/SPS, 6 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 39 n.1 (2000) (The United States
requested approval in Codex of the use of beef hormones as a safe process. Rather
than a consensus, there was a vote. Thirty-three delegates voted in favor, twenty-
nine opposed and seven abstained. Footnote 69 contains a detailed discussion of
the politicized nature of the vote; the EU tried in vain to argue that the fact that a
substantial minority had voted against the use of hormones indicated that their
use was not widely regarded as safe).
53 See Terence P. Stewart & David S. Johanson, The SPS Agreement of the
World Trade Organization and International Organizations: The Roles of the Co-
dex Alimentarius Commission, the International Plant Protection Convention, and
the International Office of Epizootics, 26 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 27, 53 n.102
(1998) (Article provides an in-depth discussion of the role of the international stan-
dards in the functioning of the WTO agreements).
54 Id. at 30.
55 See Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diver-
sity, Jan. 29, 2000, 39 I.L.M. 1027 (2000), available at http://www.biodiv.org/bi-
osafety/protocol.asp [hereinafter Protocol].
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Article 37.56 The United States is not a party to the Protocol,
although it was actively involved in the negotiation process.
57
The provisions of the Protocol refer primarily to seeds and
agriculture, but there are also provisions which have relevance
for GMF. 58 The Protocol covers only live modified organisms
(LMO), not processed foods, and as such, will have limited ap-
plication to the regulation of GMO.5 9 However, many GMO are
live foods. Produce such as GM tomatoes, squash or potatoes,
and live GM, grains which could be used as feed or seed, could
conceivably fall under the Protocol provisions.
Provisions relevant to GMF include labeling provisions
which apply to GMO and which are "intended for direct use as
food or feed, or for processing."60 Article 18 requires that GMO
which are "intended for direct use as food or feed, or for process-
ing be clearly identified that they 'may contain' [GMO] and are
not intended for intentional introduction into the environ-
ment."6 1 Although not denoted as such, the Protocol has estab-
lished a labeling requirement for GMF, which are
commodities. 62 Annex II spells out what information must be
contained in a required notification to a Biosafety Clearing
House set up to monitor GMO. 63 Countries are permitted to reg-
ulate GMO and GMF following a notification and decision-mak-
ing procedure outlined in Articles 8 through 12.64 The Protocol
56 See Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, Status of Ratification and Entry Into
Force, at http://www.biodiv.org/biosafety/signinglist.aspx (last modified Aug. 11,
2003).
57 For a discussion of the negotiations, see Lisa A. Tracy, Does a Genetically
Modified Rose Still Smell As Sweet? - Labeling of Genetically Modified Organisms
Under the Biosafety Protocol, 6 BUFF. ENVTL L.J. 129 (1999).
58 See Gareth W. Schweizer, Note, The Negotiation of the Cartagena Protocol
on Biosafety, 6 ENVTL. LAW. 577, 592 (2000).
59 See Protocol, supra note 55, art. 1.
60 Id. art. 18.
61 Id.
62 This issue was apparently very divisive for many in the negotiations for the
Protocol. See Tracy, supra note 57, for a discussion of the positions taken and com-
promises made; see Schweizer, supra note 58, at 600 (stating unequivocally that
importers have the option to label commodities as containing LMOs and consum-
ers may thus choose whether to purchase them).
63 See Protocol, supra note 55, Annex II.
64 Id. arts. 8-12.
11
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specifically recognizes the precautionary principle, which is dis-
cussed below. 65
The Preamble to the Protocol specifically preserves the par-
ties' rights under other international treaties, which means
that in a dispute over whether the Protocol or the WTO control,
the WTO would likely take precedence. 66 However, the Pream-
ble also provides that "the above recital is not intended to
subordinate this protocol to other international agreements." 67
One commentator has argued that despite the savings clause, in
the case of a conflict between the Convention and the WTO, the
Protocol provisions could prevail. 68 The Protocol will apply to
non-parties if they attempt to export to member parties, 69
which means that non-signatories, such as the United States,
could be bound by the terms of the Protocol.
3. OECD Working Parties and Discussions
At the request of the G8, the OECD convened a conference
on GM Foods in Edinburgh at the end of February 2000.70 It
included more than 400 participants from governments, non-
governmental organizations, and industry.71 The report of the
conference highlighted a number of conclusions and concerns on
which there was general agreement among the majority of the
participants. These include the need for a more open and trans-
parent debate on the topic of GM foods, and a science-based ap-
proach to the issues raised.72 Divisive issues on which there
was little agreement included the extent to which participants
regard issues surrounding GMF as inseparable from wider is-
sues, such as environmental and moral concerns. 73 There was
65 Id. pmbl.; see also Jonathan A. Glass, Comment, The Merits of Ratifying
and Implementing the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, 21 Nw. J. INT'L. L. & Bus.
491, 510 (2001).
66 See Protocol, supra note 55, pmbl.; Glass, supra note 65, at 510.
67 Protocol, supra note 55, pmbl.
68 For a discussion of whether the WTO or the Protocol would prevail, an issue
that goes beyond the scope of this paper, see Gaston & Abate, supra note 27.
69 See Protocol, supra note 55, art. 24.
70 See Chairman of OECD Conference Calls For International Consultative
Panel on GM Foods, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, at
http://wwwl.oecd.org/media/release/nwOO-23a.htm (Mar. 1, 2000).
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
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also continued disagreement about mandatory labeling of GMF,
about the usefulness of feeding trials, and on the process of as-
sessing consumer concerns.74
The Conference Chairman's report to the G8 included his
view that labeling would provide consumers with the ability to
choose whether to eat GMF or not.75 He also acknowledged ar-
eas of concern about testing. 76 A review of the "substantial
equivalence" tool was recommended, as was a re-examination of
methods for testing GMF toxicity and allergenicity. 77
As part of the conference, the OECD formed a number of
working groups, building on a growing OECD expertise in bio-
technology. The OECD applies a science and rules-based ap-
proach to its research. The reports of working groups sent to the
G8 include:
* OECD Taskforce for the Safety of Novel Foods and Feeds, dis-
cussing the consumer safety issues addressed by food safety
assessors, including on-going review and discussion of the
principle of substantial equivalence as a safety assessment
tool. 78 There is also specific mention of the need for greater
post-market surveillance of GMF to assess potential human
health issues.79
* OECD Working Group for the Harmonization of Regulatory
Oversight in Biotechnology, reporting on environmental safety
concerns regarding GM foods.80
* OECD Ad Hoc Group on Food Safety, reporting on national
and international measures to address current and emerging
food safety issues.81
* Summary reports from extensive consultations with Non-Gov-
ernmental Organizations.8 2
74 Id.
75 See Chairman's Report on OECD GM Food Safety Conference, Organiza-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development, at http://wwwl.oecd.org/media/
release/nw00-31a.htm (Apr. 7, 2000).
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 See Chairman's Report on OECD GM Food Safety Conference, supra note
75.
81 Id.
82 Id.
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While non-binding, the OECD working groups reports pro-
vide a further indication of the extent to which governments
and multi-national organizations see a need to address emerg-
ing GM issues.
4. Rules of the World Trade Organization
The WTO's regulatory scheme will be discussed in detail
below. For the purposes of this section, a brief overview of the
general background of the WTO and the regulatory framework
is offered.
The WTO is the successor organization to the GATT.8 3
Founded after the Uruguay round of the GATT, the WTO was
established by the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization.8 4 The WTO is focused specifically on
elimination of trade barriers.8 5 Its goals are non-discrimination,
transparency, and a rules and science-based approach to resolu-
tion of trade disputes.8 6 Harmonization of countries' trade mea-
sures is encouraged through reliance on international
standards.87
The WTO rules establish a notification procedure, whereby
countries notify the WTO Secretariat of potential measures that
may directly or indirectly affect international trade.88 Other
WTO members have the right to comment on such measures.
Once the measures are in force, any country that is negatively
affected can request consultation with the member imposing
the regulation. Should the consultations fail to be effective, the
exporting country may then request that a WTO Panel (Panel)
83 See Smith, supra note 52, at 39 n.1.
84 Id.
85 See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, LE-
GAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND Vol. 1, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994)
[hereinafter WTO Agreement].
86 See OAS Summary Description of the Uruguay Round Marrakesh Agree-
ment Establishing the World Trade Organization Final Act Embodying the Results
of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Organization of Ameri-
can States, at http://www.sice.oas.org/summary/ur-round/ur7.asp (last visited
Sept. 29, 2003).
87 See Kevin C. Kennedy, Resolving International Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Disputes in the WTO: Lessons and Future Directions, 55 FOOD DRUG L.J. 81, 85
(2000).
88 See generally, WTO Rules of Conduct for the Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, WT/DSB/RC/1 (Dec. 11, 1996),
available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/rc_e.htm.
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be convened to adjudicate the dispute. If not satisfied with the
Panel's decision, either country may request that an Appellate
Body review the Panel's decision. If the Panel or Appellate Body
finds that a measure violates WTO trade rules, it recommends
that the nation concerned modify the measure to bring it into
compliance. If the country refuses, the affected exporting coun-
try is then justified in imposing retaliatory trade sanctions.8 9
Two agreements under the WTO have particular relevance
to potential disputes over labeling of GMF. They are sketched
briefly here, and discussed in more depth below.
The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) regulates measures
taken to protect the life or health of humans, plants or ani-
mals.90 The SPS Agreement requires a scientific justification for
the measure imposed, in the form of a risk assessment which is
based on scientific evidence.9 1 It encourages countries to follow
international standards set by bodies such as the Codex Ali-
mentarius.9 2 If inadequate scientific evidence is available, the
importing country may impose temporary measures.9 3 In any
event, the measure imposed may not discriminate among coun-
tries, and must be the least trade-restrictive measure
possible.9 4
The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade95 (TBT
Agreement) applies to regulations and standards which regu-
late the production, processes, packaging, labeling, etc. of both
agricultural and industrial products.96 There are notice require-
89 See, e.g., York, supra note 7, at 461 (the United States took retaliatory mea-
sures against the EU, after the EU refused to modify its ban on import of beef
treated with hormones, at a cost of $116.8 million).
90 See Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
1994 WL 761483, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/sps-e/sp-
sagr-e.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2003) [hereinafter SPS Agreement].
91 Id. art. 2.2.
92 Id. arts. 3.1, 3.2.
93 Id. art 5.7.
94 Id. arts. 2.3, 5.5, 5.6.
95 See Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, LEGAL INSTRU-
MENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND Vol. 1 (1994), available at http:l!
www.jurisint.org/pub/06/en/doc/16.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2003) [hereinafter
TBT Agreement].
96 Id. art. 1.3, Annex 1.
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ments to other members.9 7 Technical regulations may not dis-
criminate between like products,98 and must not be more trade-
restrictive than necessary to achieve their aims.9 9 The TBT
Agreement also encourages the use of international standards,
as long as they are effective to achieve the importing country's
objectives. 100 Members shall also, so far as possible, recognize
other countries' regulations as equivalent. 1° 1 Provision is made
for deviation from some of the requirements when necessary to
protect safety, health or the environment. 10 2 Members are re-
quired to adhere to a Code of Good Practice for the Preparation,
Adoption and Application of Standards. 03
While many of their provisions are mirror images, the two
Agreements are mutually exclusive. A measure cannot fall
under both Agreements simultaneously. 0 4
B. Underlying Principles
Three underlying principles are recurring threads running
through multilateral regulation of GMO and GMF. They are re-
quired for adoption of certain measures in some cases, and are
offered as justification in others. They are also a source of con-
flict. These principles are the scientific principle, the precau-
tionary principle and the principle of substantial equivalence.
1. Scientific Principle
The scientific principle requires that measures taken to re-
strain trade be based on neutral science. While "science" is not
specifically defined, references to it generally imply scientific
practices, evidence, and data that are verifiable. 0 5 In multilat-
eral regulation of GMF, the scientific principle is expressed as
the requirement for a risk assessment based on sound sci-
97 Id. arts. 2.9, 2.91, 2.92, 2.93, 2.94.
98 Id. art. 2.1.
99 TBT Agreement, art. 2.2.
100 Id. art. 2.4.
101 Id. art. 2.7.
102 Id. art. 2.10.
103 Id. art. 4, Annex 3.
104 See Kennedy, supra note 87, at 91.
105 See Vern R. Walker, Keeping the WTO from Becoming the "World Trans-
science Organization". Scientific Uncertainty, Science Policy, and Factfinding in
the Growth Hormones Dispute, 31 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 251 (1998).
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ence. 10 6 All of the multilateral fora discussed above require
some form of risk assessment or science-based approach. 10 7
Risk analysis includes three components: risk assessment, risk
management and risk communication.10 8
Risk assessment analyzes the probability of risk, including
determining what adverse effects could occur, and what the
magnitude of the consequences could be.10 9 This first compo-
nent also includes an assessment of the level of uncertainty as
to the state of knowledge about both the adverse consequences
and the likelihood of its occurrence.110 Uncertainty derives from
a general lack of knowledge, and also from uncertainty as to
causation, choices of variables in the data collection and the ex-
periments, samples drawn and mathematical models chosen." 1
Risk assesment is the subject of working committees to stand-
ardize approaches and assist developing countries with the
technical aspects. 112
The second component is risk management, defined as "the
process of identifying, evaluating, selecting, and implementing
actions to reduce risk."1 3 Risk management involves a decision
regarding the acceptable level of risk, or what level of protection
106 Id. at 256.
107 See, e.g., Report of the First Session of the Codex Ad Hoc Intergovernmen-
tal Task Force on Foods Derived from Biotechnology, Joint FAO/WHO Food Stan-
dards Programme, Codex Alimentarius Commission, ALINORM 01/34 (2000), at ftp:/
/ftp.fao.org/codex/alinorm0l/A1O134e.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2003); Codex Ali-
mentarius Commission, Draft Principles for Risk Analysis of Foods Derived from
Modern Biotechnology, ALINORM, at http:I/ www.codexalimentarius.net/biotech/en/
ra-fbt.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2003); OECD Report, supra note 27; WTO Com-
mittee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Summary Report on the SPS
Risk Analysis Workshop, G/SPS/GEN/209 (Nov. 3, 2000) (discussing the funda-
mentals of risk analysis), available at http://www.wto.org/englishl/tratope/sps-e/
risk00_e/risk00_e.htm [hereinafter WTO Summary Report]; Protocol, supra note
55, art. 15.
108 See WTO Summary Report, supra note 107, para. 45.
109 Id. para. 12.
110 Id.; see also Walker, supra note 105, at 258.
111 See WTO Summary Report, supra note 107, paras. 17-18; Walker, supra
note 105, at 258.
112 See WTO Summary Report, supra note 107, paras. 17-18 and further links
at wto.org.
113 Walker, supra note 105, at 255.
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is deemed appropriate. 114 This decision is a sovereign one in-
volving considerations of domestic policy. 115
Under SPS rules, countries are largely free to choose their
acceptable level of risk, within the constraints of the SPS
rules. 1 6 One goal of the SPS Agreement is harmonization of
member countries' approaches to both risk assessment and risk
management."17 One way the SPS Agreement attempts to
achieve this is by promoting reliance on rule making bodies
such as Codex Alimentarius. 118 Both risk assessment and risk
management loom large in WTO cases to date on food, animal,
and plant safety.
The third component is risk communication. There is little
written on risk communication, either in the commentaries or
in the official bodies' work on risk assessment. The notification
requirements of SPS measures could conceivably be considered
as part of risk communication. The EU has a position paper on
Food Safety, including a section on risk communication. 1 9 In
the context of food safety, the EU defines risk communication as
making scientific opinions available as quickly and widely as
possible. 120 The EU also stresses consumers' need to have ac-
cess to information on these issues, and states that the con-
sumer must be viewed as a fully recognized stakeholder in the
debate on food safety.' 2 ' One commentator argues strongly that
adoption of science policies would increase transparency of the
decisions underlying risk management, which could also serve
as risk communication. 22
114 Id. at 256; see also WTO Summary Report, supra note 107, para. 14.
115 See Walker, supra note 105, at 256.
116 See SPS Agreement, supra note 90, art 2.1; Walker, supra note 105, at 268-
69.
117 See Walker, supra note 105, at 256; WTO Summary Report, supra note 107,
para. 9.
118 See WTO Summary Report, supra note 107, paras. 9, 10; Walker, supra
note 105, at 273-74.
119 See Commission of the European Communities, White Paper on Food
Safety, COM (1999) 719 final (Jan. 12, 2000), ch. 7, available at http:ll eu-
ropa.eu.int/comm/food/fs/intro/indexen.html [hereinafter White Paper].
120 Id. at chs. 4, 7.
121 Id. at ch. 7.
122 See Walker, supra note 105, at 261, 271. Science policies are "default as-
sumptions." Id. at 259 n.42. An example of a science policy is one that "prohibits
the use of food additives that cause cancer in laboratory animals." Id. at 266.
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2. Precautionary Principle
The precautionary principle is more controversial than the
scientific principle, and is not yet firmly anchored in world
trade regulation. It derives originally from environmental
law123 and is an important principle in the Cartagena Proto-
col. 124 Its basic premise is that a country may err on the side of
caution in the face of large uncertainty as to potential risks or
risks of uncertain magnitude, even without firm scientific evi-
dence to support this.1 25 It may be described as a derogation
from the scientific principle. 126
The EU, among others, relies on this principle, 27 while the
United States, among others, opposes its use in trade disputes
over food safety. 128 The EU regards use of the precautionary
principle as part of risk management, in determining how much
risk is tolerable. 29 According to the EU, the precautionary
principle plays no role in risk analysis, which must be science
based.' 30 Rather, the precautionary principle comes into play
where the political decision must be made as to the acceptable
level of risk.' 3 ' The EU states limits on the use of the precau-
tionary principle, namely those which apply to risk manage-
ment in general: proportionality, non-discrimination,
consistency, cost/benefit analysis (including non-economic fac-
123 See Dr. Hans-Joachim Priess & Dr. Chistian Pitchas, Protection of Public
Health and the Role of the Precautionary Principle Under WTO Law: A Trojan
Horse before Geneva's Walls? 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 519, 520, (2000); Konrad von
Moltke, The Dilemma of the Precautionary Principle in International Trade,
BRIDGES WEEKLY NEWS TRADE DIGEST, at 3-4, available at http:l! ictsd.org/English/
BRIDGES3-6.pdf (Jul-Aug. 1999) (discussing the origins of the precautionary prin-
ciple in a German environmental law of 1968).
124 See Protocol, supra note 55, art. 1 (referencing Article 15 of the Rio Declara-
tion on Environment and Development).
125 See Priess & Pitchas, supra note 123, at 520-24.
126 Id. at 522.
127 See White Paper, supra note 1 19, at executive summary, ch. 3.
128 See U.S., Europeans Pledge to Continue Work on Applying Precautionary
Principle, 17 INT'L TRADE REPORTER 16, 619 (Apr. 20, 2000); Draft U.S. Position on
Risk Analysis Biased Toward Trade, Consumer Group Comments, 17 INT'L TRADE
REPORTER 27, 1041 (Jul. 6, 2000); U.S. Expects Codex Discussion on Proposal to
Trace Biotech Crops, 18 INT'L TRADE REPORTER 8, 304 (Feb. 22, 2001) (discussing
the various controversial issues before the Codex Committees, including the pre-
cautionary principle).
129 See Priess & Pitchas, supra note 123, at 530-31.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 531.
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tors), and examination of scientific developments. 132 The Codex
Committee on General Principles is currently working on har-
monization of the definition and application of the precaution-
ary principle. 133
3. Substantial Equivalence
The third principle often used to assess food safety is that
of substantial equivalence. This concept is endorsed by the Food
and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and World Health Organi-
zation (WHO) of the UN, and favored by the OECD.134 Substan-
tial equivalence is defined by the OECD as the "idea that
existing organisms used as food, or as a source of food, can be
used as the basis for comparison when assessing the safety of
human consumption of a food or food component that has been
modified or is new." 35 One compares the trait encoded by the
genetic modification to an appropriate comparator in the tradi-
tional food. 13 6 Establishing the similarity to a traditional food
which is safe indicates that the new food will also be safe.' 37
OECD views this approach as the most practical in assessing
GMF for food safety. 138
However, establishing substantial equivalence does not au-
tomatically mean that a novel food is safe. Substantial equiva-
lence is not a safety assessment per se. 139 Once a substantial
equivalence assessment has been made, there are three possible
scenarios which could arise: (1) If the products are nearly iden-
tical, the novel product can be considered as safe as its tradi-
tional counterpart; (2) If equivalence is established apart from
certain defined characteristics, risk analysis should focus on the
identified differences; and (3) If no substantial equivalence can
132 Id. at 533.
133 See Codex Alimentarius Commission, Report of the Fifteenth Session of the
Codex Committee on General Principles, ALINORM 01/33 (2000), app. III, at http:l!
www.fao.org/docrep/meeting/005/x7101e/x7lOleOO.htm [hereinafter Codex 15th
Sess. Report].
134 See OECD Report, supra note 27, at 5.
135 Id. at 22.
136 Id. at 21.
137 Id. at 22.
138 Id. at 22.
139 Id.
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be established, a testing program would have to be imple-
mented on a case-by-case basis.
140
Substantial equivalence as a standard is under discussion
in the Codex Alimentarius Committee on Food Labeling, with
the United States as a proponent. 141 0 Opponents of substantial
equivalence point to the very fundamental difference of the
product which contains DNA protein from another species.
1 42
They also point to the fact that many novel foods are patented
as unique, and argue that they cannot then also be considered
equivalent to non-GM varieties.1 4
3
There is an overlapping, sometimes inconsistent body of
law regulating international trade, which will be applied to the
potential disputes over labeling. There are also gaps in regula-
tion due to the sometimes slow process of negotiating norms in
multilateral bodies. In the absence of international norms spe-
cific to the topic, many countries have taken unilateral steps to
regulate GMF.
C. National Regulation of and Labeling Requirements for
Genetically Modified Foods
As might be expected from the foregoing, national regula-
tion of GMF tends to divide along importer/exporter country
lines, with exporting countries having little or no regulation of
GMF, and importing countries attempting to restrict GMF. The
regulatory schemes of the various countries, both those already
adopted and those proposed, are outlined briefly below.
1. United States
The United States has an overlapping system of regulation
of GMO and GMF, spread among a number of government
agencies. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is charged
with oversight of food safety, while the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA) is in charge of safety of pesticides, and the
140 Id.
141 See Codex 28th Sess. Report, supra note 45, para. 43.
142 See Mathew Stilwell & Brennan Van Dyke, An Activist's Handbook on Ge-
netically Modified Organisms and the WTO, Center for International Environmen-
tal Law, Consumers Choice Council (Jul. 1999), at www.consumerscouncil.org/
policy/handbk799.htm.
143 Id.
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Department of Agriculture has responsibility for GM plants.144
With respect to GMF, in 1992 the FDA published its "Statement
of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties." 145 This pol-
icy implemented a registration procedure for companies which
plan to bring such foods to market. The FDA recommends that
developers consult with the FDA about bio-engineered foods
under development. 146 The company itself does the safety test-
ing, and informs the FDA of its scientific and regulatory assess-
ment of the food.147 FDA evaluates the submissions and if there
are no difficulties noted, the product may be freely commercial-
ized. 148 Labeling is required only in exceptional circumstances,
if the food differs significantly from the traditional variety. 49
As of July 2001, the FDA had completed consultations with in-
dustry on more than fifty bioengineered plant products. 50 The
official FDA policy is that GMF are safe, unless proven other-
wise. 15' Companies conduct research, notify the FDA if there
appear to be any problems, and bring their products to market.
144 See the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for an overview of food safety,
at www.fda.gov (last visited Oct. 1, 2003); the Environmental Protection Agency(EPA) for EPA policy regarding GMO, at www.epa.gov/pesticides; the United
States Department of Agriculture (USDA) for information on GMO, at
www.usda.gov (last visited Oct. 1, 2003).
145 See Statement of Policy: Foods Derived from New Plant Varieties, Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services, Food and Drug Administration, 57 FR 22984(1992), available at http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/-lrd/fr92529b.html [hereinafter 1992
FDA Policy]
146 Id. at 22985.
147 Id. at 22985, 22989.
148 Id. at 22985.
149 Id. at 22991.
150 See Mitchell A. Cheeseman & James C. Wallwork, FDA's Office of Food
Additive Safety, U. S. Food and Drug Administration, reprinted from Food Safety
Magazine (Dec. 2002/Jan. 2003), at http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/-dms/opaofas.html
(last modified Feb. 6, 2003).
151 See 1992 FDA Policy, supra note 145, at 22988 ("Foods derived from new
plant varieties are not routinely subjected to scientific tests for safety, although
there are exceptions. For example, potatoes are generally tested for the glycoalka-
loid, solanine. The established practices that plant breeders employ in selecting
and developing new varieties of plants, such as chemical analyses, taste testing,
and visual analyses, rely primarily on observations of quality, wholesomeness, and
agronomic characteristics. Historically, these practices have proven to be reliable
for ensuring food safety. The knowledge from this past experience coupled with
safe practices in plant breeding has contributed to continuous improvements in the
quality, variety, nutritional value, and safety of foods derived from plants modified
by a range of traditional and increasingly sophisticated techniques. Based on this
record of safe development of new varieties of plants, FDA has not found it neces-
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In response to growing concerns among American scientists
and consumers, in November 1999 the FDA convened public
discussions about GMF. 152 It has not yet made any changes in
its policy or oversight based on this input, but issued a proposal
in January 2001 for voluntary labeling guidelines for produc-
ers. 153 However, there is growing public pressure for labeling in
the United States. Bills have been introduced in Congress to
require mandatory labels. 154 Companies are beginning to label
their products "non-GMO" in response to consumer demand.155
The FDA has warned five natural food companies that their
"GMO-free" labels are misleading consumers.1 56 There is cur-
rently no approved text from FDA on what a label could say.15 7
Another example of growing consumer concern is evidenced by a
movement in three towns in Vermont to vote on whether GMF
should be labeled, and whether there should be a moratorium
on them while they are studied.158
Thus, while the official U.S. policy and law is that GMF
need not be regulated or labeled, there is a movement among
consumers and lawmakers in the United States to change this
policy.
sary to conduct, prior to marketing, routine safety reviews of whole foods derived
from plants").
152 See, e.g., Statement of Rebecca Goldburg, of the Environmental Defense
Fund, at the FDA Public Hearing on Genetically Engineered Foods, Environmen-
tal Defense, at http://www.environmentaldefense.org/documents/1662_Goldburg-
FDA1999.pdf (Nov. 30, 1999). The Hearing was held during the World Trade Or-
ganization in Seattle, which may explain the lack of attention to the statements
made at the hearing. Id. Rebecca Goldburg, a biologist with a Ph.D, commented on
the food safety and regulation of genetically engineered foods. Id. She stated that
the added substances in the foods may cause consumers to be allergic to foods they
previously could consume safely. Id. She also stated that the FDA's current regula-
tion did more to protect the biotechnology industry than consumers. Id.
153 See York, supra note 7, at 441.
154 Id. at 442 (Bills were introduced by Representative Dennis Kucinish (D-
OH) in Nov. 1999 and Senator Barbara Boxer (D-CA) in Jan. 2000).
155 See Scott Kilman, FDA Warns of Misleading Labels On Genetic Modifica-
tion in Foods, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Dec. 20, 2001, available at 2001 WL-
WSJ 29681303.
156 Id.
157 Id.
158 See Vermont Towns Begin Voting on Genetically Engineered Foods, Associ-
ATED PREss, Dec. 16, 2001, available at http://www.organicconsumers.org/gefood/
vermontl21801.cfm.
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2. Switzerland
Switzerland appears to have been the earliest country to
impose a comprehensive approval and labeling regime for GMF.
In a 1992 referendum, 159 the Swiss approved a constitutional
amendment regulating GMO and providing a regulatory frame-
work. 160 A second referendum in 1995 brought about the adop-
tion of regulations requiring that any GMF be approved before
it is introduced into the market, and that all GMF be labeled. 161
In its approach to approval and labeling, the Swiss legislature
appears to have closely followed WTO rules.
Approval for GMF will only be granted if there is certainty,
based on actual scientific knowledge, that the product poses no
threat to human health.162 The Swiss regulations call for both
positive and negative labeling. "Since June 1999, a food product
must be labeled produced with GMO if any of its ingredients
contain more than one percent GMO."163 The reason given is to
prevent deceptive practices and to allow consumers choice of
what they eat. 64 The same rationale applies to negative labels.
A product may only be labeled "produced without GMO" if three
criteria are met: (1) none of its ingredients contain more than
one percent GMO; (2) no GMO were used in the production or
processing of the food; and (3) a similar GM food or ingredient
has been approved for the Swiss market. 65 In other words, food
may be labeled "non-GMO" only if there is danger of confusion
with a GMF on the market. Labels proclaiming a product "GM-
free" are not permitted, since it is believed that it is not possible
to guarantee that a product is 100 percent free of GM
contamination.166
159 See Franz Xaver Perrez, Taking Consumers Seriously: The Swiss Regula-
tory Approach to Genetically Modified Food, 8 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 585 (2000) (not-
ing that the Swiss system of government provides for mandatory and voluntary
direct referenda, where the public directly approve laws, make changes to the con-
stitution, and pass resolutions calling for lawmakers to pass legislation effectuat-
ing the wishes of the people expressed in the referendum).
160 Id.
161 Id. at 590-91.
162 Id. at 596.
163 Id. at 597.
164 Perez, supra note 159, at 597.
165 Id.
166 Id. at 598.
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The Swiss regulations are intended to be fully compliant
with WTO rules. Approval to introduce GMO or GMF into the
Swiss market must be based on science. The regulations rely on
international standards wherever they exist. 167 The labeling re-
quirements are designed to prevent deceptive practices and pro-
vide choice to consumers. 168
3. European Union
The EU has passed legislation requiring mandatory label-
ing for GMF.169 It requires pre-marketing notification to the
country of import before the product is placed on the market.
170
Approval is based on an assessment of risk.1 7' A product must
be considered "safe" to be imported.1 72 The scientific data
needed for assessment is to be provided by the seller.173 Once a
product is approved for sale by one EU member, it is free to
circulate throughout the EU.1
74
GMF food products approved for sale in the EU require la-
bels. Labeling requirements are intended to provide informa-
tion to consumers,1 75 for health reasons, 176 for ethical
reasons 177 and to prevent them from being misled.' 78 A label is
required if the GMF is no longer equivalent to an existing food
or ingredient, as determined by a scientific assessment; or if the
food contains GMO that may have health implications for parts
of the population or cause ethical concerns.' 79 There does not
appear to be a minimum threshold of GMO that triggers the
labeling requirement. The criteria is whether the novel food is
"no longer equivalent" to the existing food.' 80 In this case, a la-
167 Id. at 599.
168 Id. at 597.
169 See Council Regulation 258/97 of 27 January 1997 Concerning Novel Foods
and Novel Food Ingredients, art. 8, 1997 O.J. (L 43) 1 [hereinafter Novel Foods
Regulation].
170 Id. art. 4.
171 Id. arts. 4, 6.
172 Id. arts. 3.1, 6.
173 Id. arts. 4.1, 6.1.
174 Novel Foods Regulation, supra note 169, art. 4.
175 Id. art. 8.
176 Id. at eighth "whereas" clause.
177 Id.
178 Id. art. 3.1.
179 Id. art. 8.
180 Novel Foods Regulation, supra note 169, art. 8.
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bel is required. 181 "No longer equivalent" is defined as a scien-
tific determination that there are characteristics that are
different, having regard to the natural limits of variation for
such characteristics.182
Negative labels are permitted. 18 3 Food that does not con-
tain GMO may be labeled as such. 184
4. New Zealand and Australia
New Zealand and Australia have a Joint Food Safety Regu-
lation which forms a comprehensive program regulating GMO
and GMF in both countries. 8 5 The New Zealand Ministry of the
Environment is the lead government agency administering the
programs. For space reasons, only the New Zealand program
will be described in detail here.
A Royal Commission in New Zealand was convened to
study the various issues surrounding the introduction of GMO
and GMF.186 Prior to convening the Royal Commission, no
GMO or GMF had been approved for release. 187 During the
study, a voluntary moratorium on introduction of GMO and
GMF was in place.' 88 In addition to potential economic, medical
and other benefits to be derived from GMO and GMF, the Royal
Commission also inquired into areas of public concern. 189 These
included human health, environmental concerns, including bi-
odiversity, as well as cultural and ethical concerns, with partic-
ular reference to ethical concerns of indigenous peoples. 190
181 Id.
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 Id. at tenth "whereas" clause.
185 See Terms of Reference (the Warrant), Report of the Royal Commission on
Genetic Modification, Environmental Risk Management Authority, New Zealand
(Jul. 27, 2001), at http://www.gmcommission.govt.nz/intro/warrant-eng.html
[hereinafter Terms of Reference]. The full report of the Royal Commission is avail-
able at http://www.gmcommission.govt.nz/RCGM/rcgm-report.html.
186 Id.
187 See Royal Commission of Inquiry into Genetic Modification, Frequently
Asked Questions about Genetic Modification and the Governments decisions, En-
vironmental Risk Management Authority, New Zealand, at http://
www.ermanz.govt.nz/news-events/focus/royal-commission-govt-qa.asp (Oct. 2001)
[hereinafter Frequently Asked Questions].
188 Id.
189 See Terms of Reference, supra note 185.
190 Id.
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The Commission ended in July of 2001 and legislation in
New Zealand regarding GMF has been passed. 191 Regulation
regarding GMF and GMO in New Zealand is governed by a
number of laws, with different agencies having oversight over
different areas. 192 One such agency is the Hazardous Sub-
stances and New Organisms (HSNO) Act of 1996, which is in-
tended to protect the environment and health of New
Zealanders. 193
GMF introduced into New Zealand are regulated under the
Food Act of 1981 and a joint Australia New Zealand Food Stan-
dard (ANZFS). New Zealand requires GMF be assessed for
safety by the Australia New Zealand Food Authority (ANZFA)
and in most cases labeled, before it can be sold.194 If it contains
a live GMO, such as a tomato with seeds, it must also be ap-
proved by the environmental agency.' 95 The food labeling rules
came into effect in December 2001.196 As of December 7, 2001,
any food that contains more than one percent genetically modi-
fied material must be labeled identifying its GM status. 197 Food
already in stores need not be retroactively labeled nor must food
sold in restaurants be labeled. 98 The exemption also includes
highly refined foods where refining removes novel DNA and/or
protein. 199 By December 7, 2002, any food with GM ingredients
191 Id.
192 See Understanding the Royal Commission on Genetic Modification - a sim-
ple guide to the process and recommendations, Environmental Risk Management
Authority, New Zealand, at http://www.mfe.govt.nz/issues/organisms/commission
(last visited Oct. 2, 2003).
193 See Terms of Reference, supra note 185.
194 See Ten Facts About Genetic Modification, No. 5, Genetic Modification,
Ministry for the Environment, New Zealand, at http://www.gm.govt.nz/facts.shtml
(last visited Oct. 17, 2003).
195 See GM Topics: How Genetic Modification Is Regulated?, Genetic Modifica-
tion, Ministry for the Environment, New Zealand, at http://www.gm.govt.nz/topics-
food-regulated.shtml (last visited Oct. 17, 2003).
196 See Labeling: Australia New Zealand, Transgenic Crops: An Introduction
and Resource Guide, at http://www.isaaa.org/kc/issues/labeling/country/austra-
lia.htm (2003).
197 See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 187.
198 Id.
199 See Labelling Genetically Modified Foods, Food Standards: Australia New
Zealand, at http://www.foodstandards.gov.au/mediareleasespublications/fact-
sheets/factsheets2000/labellinggenetically29.cfm (Aug. 2000) [hereinafter Label-
ling Genetically Modified Foods].
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must be labeled.200 The labeling regime is considered by New
Zealand to be in line with that of the EU.20 1
5. Canada
At present, Canada does not require labeling of GMF.
There appears to be quite a volatile debate within the govern-
ment and among the citizens on whether labeling should be re-
quired. A bill requiring mandatory labeling on GMF sponsored
by a private member was defeated in Parliament in October
2001,202 despite its support by the Canadian Minister of
Health.20 3 The bill would have required labeling for any food
containing more than one percent genetically modified ingredi-
ents. 20 4 In August 2001, the Canadian Biotechnology Advisory
Committee released an interim report that recommended a vol-
untary system of labeling, but the Minister of Health noted that
there was no consensus on acceptable standards, such as the
percentage of GM that would trigger a label. 20 5
Debate on GMF continues among various sectors of Cana-
dian society. An independent scientific panel of the Royal Soci-
ety of Canada made a number of recommendations to the
government regarding safety of GMO and GMF.2o6 The Cana-
dian Wheat Board (CWB) has recommended a moratorium on
introduction of GM wheat in Canada, largely to protect poten-
tial markets.20 7 The CWB's position statement acknowledges
consumer concern, and that overseas customers have expressed
200 See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 187.
201 See Labelling Genetically Modified Foods, supra note 199.
202 See Debate Erupts After Canada Parliament Votes Against GE Food Labels,
THE OTTAWA CITIZEN, Oct. 18, 2001, available at http://www.organicconsumers.org/
gefood/mplabels 102901.cfm.
203 See Robert Fife, Canada Minister of Health Wants Mandatory Labels on GE
Food, NATIONAL POST (Canada), Oct 5, 2001, available at http://www.organiccon-
sumers.org/gefood/canadalabel.cfm.
204 See Debate Erupts After Canada Parliament Votes Against GE Food Labels,
supra note 202.
205 See Fife, supra note 203.
206 See Elements of Precaution: Recommendations for the Regulation of Food
Biotechnology in Canada, The Royal Society of Canada, at http://www.rsc.ca/food-
biotechnology/indexEN.html (Jan. 2001).
207 See CWB Draws Attention to Concerns Over GM Wheat, Canadian Wheat
Board (Apr. 4, 2001) at http://www.cwb.ca/en/news/releases/2001/040301.jsp. (Apr.
4, 2001).
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a disinclination to purchase GM wheat. 208 The inability to ade-
quately segregate GM grain from traditional varieties plays an
important role.20 9 The CWB is working with the Royal Society
of Canada to develop voluntary labeling rules. A broad coalition
of groups in Canada support this position. Its members include
the National Farmers Union, the Keystone Agricultural Produc-
ers of Manitoba, and Greenpeace of Canada. 21° Canada is a sig-
natory to the Cartagena Protocol and, as such, bound by its
terms.
Although the current state of legislation in Canada does
not require labeling for GMF, it appears that this might change
in the future.
6. South Korea
South Korea implemented a labeling regime for GMF which
came into effect on March 1, 2001.211 The regulations are de-
signed to implement South Korea's commitment to the Carta-
gena Protocol. 212 The law follows the Protocol's "may contain"
rule for possible GMO content. 213 The law makes approval
mandatory for the importation, production or research of
GMO. 214 The law also requires retailers of genetically modified
beans, corn and bean sprouts to label packing material, or lay
signs beside them identifying them as genetically modified, if
they are not packaged. 215 The same provision applies to
processed foods based on GM beans, corn and bean sprouts as of
July 2001.216 As of March 2002, potatoes are also included. 217
According to the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, the pur-
208 See Canadian Coalition Calls for GE Wheat Ban, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Ca-
nada), Jul. 31, 2001, at http://www.organicconsumers.org/patent/gewheat080301.
cfm.
209 See CWB Draws Attention to Concerns Over GM Wheat, supra note 207.
210 See Canadian Coalition Calls for GE Wheat Ban, supra note 208.
211 See Korea to Enforce Labeling of GMO Products From March 1 Deadline,
ASIA PULSE, Feb. 27, 2001, available at LexisNexis.
212 See James Lim, South Korea Strengthens Regulations Covering GMO Pro-
duction, Movement, 18 INT'L TRADE REPORTER 11, 434 (Mar. 15, 2001) [hereinafter
Lim, South Korea Strengthens Regulations].
213 See James Lim, South Korea to Impose Agricultural Label Requirements for
Genetically Modified Foods, 18 INT'L TRADE REPORTER 28, 1104 (Jul. 12, 2001).
214 See Lim, South Korea Strengthens Regulations, supra note 212, at 434.
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 Id.
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pose of the rule is to provide consumers with information on ag-
ricultural products. 218
7. Brazil
The situation regarding GM foods and products in Brazil
appears to be confused and fraught with political struggles. The
sale of GM products is currently forbidden, although there are
areas where experimental plantings are permitted. 219 Brazil is
one of the few grain-exporting countries to have such a ban.
Sale of GM products was banned by a court order of 1998, until
their impact and safety could be better studied. 220 Despite such
rulings, Brazil's agriculture minister is apparently finalizing
plans to approve commercial use of five different types of GM
soy. 22 ' His announcement prompted a warning from a federal
judge that such products are still currently banned in Brazil.222
Other news reports indicate that there are large plantings of
illegal GM grains in the growing areas of Brazil.223
A presidential decree issued mid-July of 2001 provided that
effective January 2002, labeling on GM foods would be required
if the percentage of GM ingredients is over four percent. 224 This
decree was immediately challenged in court by the govern-
ment's attorney general and a consumer group, as violating the
Brazilian Consumer Defense Code. 225 The reason given was
that it does not provide enough information or protection.226 It
is thus unclear what direction Brazil will eventually take, given
the political struggles between consumers and judges on one
hand, and the government on the other. Brazil has traditionally
sided with the United States, Argentina, and other growing
countries in negotiations on labeling and regulation of GM
foods.
218 See Korea to Enforce Labeling of GMO Products From March 1 Deadline,
supra note 211.
219 See Michael Kepp, Brazilian Agency, Consumer Group File Suit Over De-
cree on GM Foddstuffs, 18 INT'L TRADE REPORTER 34, 1345 (Aug. 23, 2001).
220 See Brazilian Court Bars Cultivation of Genetically Modified Soy Beans,
AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Aug. 9, 2000, available at 2000 WL 24686842.
221 See Kepp, supra note 219, at 1346.
222 Id.
223 See Wright, supra note 38.
224 See Kepp, supra note 219, at 1345.
225 Id.
226 Id.
[Vol. 15:359
30http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol15/iss2/2
20031 APPLYING WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION RULES 389
8. Japan
Japan implemented a labeling program for GM foods as of
April 1, 2001.227 The stated purpose is to provide consumers
with the information they demand about GM status of the food
they buy, in response to their growing concerns about GMF.228
The labeling program includes both positive and negative la-
bels. From April 1, 2001, soybeans, corn, rapeseed, cottonseeds
and potatoes must be labeled as to their GM status. 229 In addi-
tion, twenty-four kinds of processed foods derived from these in-
gredients, such as tofu and bean curd, must also be labeled. 230
Tomatoes grown in the United States will be included next.23 1
Labels must state "GM-free," "GMO foods," "unknown" or
"undecided."232 The threshold for being "GM-free," for corn and
soy products, is five percent. 233 Anything over five percent re-
quires a GMO foods label. 234
In addition to the GMF labeling program, the Ministry of
Health and Welfare has instituted a mandatory food safety in-
spection program, replacing the previous voluntary program.
The purpose is to determine whether imported food is GMF or
contains GM ingredients. 235 The safety inspection is to be per-
formed by third parties before the food is exported, and the Jap-
anese Ministry of Health and Welfare will conduct spot audits
to determine compliance. 236
9. Other Countries
There are reports of other countries beginning to consider
GMF labeling. At the most recent Codex meeting, India indi-
cated that it is developing a labeling scheme in line with its pro-
posal to the Codex, i.e., labeling required for any food containing
227 See Japan to Increase Inspections of GMO, GM Food Imports; Details Com-
ing Soon, 17 INT'L TRADE REPORTER 18, 709 (May 4, 2000) [hereinafter Japan to
Increase Inspections].
228 Id. at 710.
229 See Declan Conroy, Regulation of Biotech Foods Worldwide Characterized
by Confusion, Uncertainty, 18 INT'L TRADE REPORTER 28, 1091 (Jul. 2001).
230 See Japan to Increase Inspections, supra note 227, at 709.
231 Id.
232 Id.
233 See Conroy, supra note 229, at 1091.
234 Id.
235 See Japan to Increase Inspections, supra note 227, at 709.
236 Id.
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GM ingredients or GM processes. 237 China, Taiwan, Russia,
South Africa and Mexico are also mentioned in news reports as
beginning to consider labeling for GMF.238
D. Summary
Overall, there is a growing trend toward labeling, espe-
cially for purposes of consumer information and choice. Safety
concerns are also a factor. The labeling schemes in general ap-
pear to parallel the more moderate proposals being considered
in the Codex Alimentarius working parties. They are also often
framed to comply with the Cartagena Protocol. The threshold
requirements to trigger labeling range from one to five percent,
and include both GM food eaten directly and food made with
GM ingredients. Those countries requiring labeling make up a
large percentage of the food importing countries in terms of vol-
ume. Thus the result of any dispute between GMF exporting
countries and importing countries requiring labeling is likely to
have widespread consequences.
III. DISPUTE BEFORE THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
A. Applicable Law
In a dispute over labeling of GMF brought before the WTO,
which would be the applicable law? Either the TBT Agreement
or the SPS Agreement could conceivably be applied, depending
on the terms of the complaint and the regulatory framework
that is challenged. Commentators do not appear to have a uni-
form opinion. One argues that the TBT Agreement would ap-
pear to apply to any labeling mandated for general consumer
information. 239 Others suggest that either the TBT Agreement
or the SPS Agreement could conceivably be used, but that in the
end, only the SPS Agreement could apply. 240 Yet another dis-
237 See Codex 29th Sess. Report, supra note 45, para. 75.
238 See Conroy, supra note 229, at 1091.
239 See Steve Charnovitz, The Supervision of Health and Biosafety Regulation
by World Trade Rules, 13 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 271, 296 (2000).
240 See Robert Howse & Petros C. Mavroidis, Europe's Evolving Regulatory
Strategy for GMOs - the Issue of Consistency with WTO Law: Of Kine and Brine, 24
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 317, 321 (2000); Julie Teel, Comment, Regulating Genetically
Modified Products and Processes: An Overview of Approaches, 8 N.Y.U. ENvTL. L.J.
649, 687 (2000) ("While labeling of GMOs is likely to be covered by Annex Al of the
SPS Agreement..., the two agreements have parallel provisions").
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cusses labeling requirements solely under GATT Article XX (b)
and (g). 241 In discussing the potential of relying on GATT XX or
GATT III, other commentators cite the principle of lex specialis,
and argue that the SPS Agreement would apply.242 At least one
official in the United States appears to assume that a challenge
would be brought under TBT rules. 243
In discussing a potential dispute, there is one important
unknown: This is which international standard would be ap-
plied, if any. The standard is significant because of the WTO
presumption of compliance if parties rely on international stan-
dards in drafting measures. The Codex has not yet finalized its
rules on labeling, as they are still being debated. The labeling
battle may well be won in this arena, rather than before the
WTO. The labeling rules described above could enjoy a pre-
sumption of compliance, depending on which labeling option is
chosen by the Codex. The Cartagena Protocol also has provi-
sions for labeling, but it is generally considered unlikely that
this would be an international standard on which labeling coun-
tries could rely, assuming they are signatories. 244 Some regula-
tory schemes, for instance South Korea's, are drafted to comply
241 See Philip Bentley Q.C., A Re-assessment of Art XX, Paragraphs (b) and (g)
of GATT 1994 in the Light of Growing Consumer and Environmental Concern
about Biotechnology, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 107, 127-28 (2000) (apparently assum-
ing that labeling regimes are not safety-driven, and the ethical considerations at
their root would allow a country to rely on GATT rather than one of the more
specialized rules).
242 See Howse & Mavroidis, supra note 240, at 321-22.
243 See Sharynne Nenon, Presentation to the Third Annual Roundtable on the
Liability and Labeling of Genetically Modified Organisms (May 26, 1999), at http://
www.cast-science.org/cast-science.lh/0002abab.htm. "If our trading partners de-
cide to require mandatory labeling of agricultural products made with biotechnol-
ogy, we expect them to abide by their international obligations contained in the
World Trade Organization agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agree-
ment).... The United States is unlikely to challenge biotech labeling rules based
on their objective, i.e. consumer information. However, we could choose to chal-
lenge the specific measures that countries adopt based on the obligations of Art.
2.2 of the TBT Agreement or other provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade." Id.; Edward Alden & Michael Mann, US Again Threatens EU on
Frankenfoods Moratorium, FINANCIAL TIMES (London), Dec. 18, 2001, available at
http://www.organicconsumers.org/gefood/eumoratorium122001.cfm (where a "U.S.
industry official" is quoted as saying that unless Europeans can show they have a
workable system in place to approve applications for GMOs, it is a technical bar-
rier to trade).
244 See Gaston & Abate, supra note 27, at 120 (arguing that under certain cir-
cumstances, the Protocol would take precedence over the WTO, in case of conflict;
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with the Protocol provisions. A labeling country could make a
case that reliance on the Protocol's rules should provide the
same presumption of compliance as reliance on the Codex rules.
If a case is brought before the Codex has issued its labeling
rules, uncertainty as to outcome is increased.
The relevant provisions of both the SPS Agreement and the
TBT Agreement, as well as the case law interpreting them, are
discussed below to determine under which provision a challenge
to labeling regulations should be brought. Thereafter, the provi-
sions of the labeling regimes described above are analyzed for
their conformity to the applicable Agreements, and a determi-
nation is made on whether they would withstand a challenge
under either the SPS Agreement or the TBT Agreement.
B. Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
The first agreement under which a challenge to labeling
regulations could be brought is the SPS Agreement. To date,
only three cases have been decided by the WTO under this
Agreement: EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Prod-
ucts245 (Hormones), in 1998; Australia - Measures Affecting Im-
portation of Salmon246 (Salmon), also in 1998, and Japan -
Measures Affecting Agricultural Products247 (Agricultural Prod-
ucts), in 1999. All three concerned import bans of products
under health and safety regulations of the importing country.
Hormones involved sanitary measures designed to protect
human health, Salmon involved measures to protect animal
health, and Agricultural Products concerned a phytosanitary
measure to protect plants against pests. Many of the same is-
Grosko, supra note 5 (discussing the relationship between the WTO and the
Protocol).
245 See WTO Appellate Body Report, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, (Jan. 16, 1998), available at www.wto.org/
english/tratop-e/dispu-e/ab-reports-e.htm [hereinafter Hormones Appellate Body
Report].
246 See WTO Appellate Body Report, Australia - Measures Affecting Importa-
tion of Salmon, WT/DS18/AB/R, (Oct. 20, 1998), 1998 WL 731009, available at
www.wto.org/englishtratop-e/dispu-e/ab-reports-e.htm [hereinafter Salmon Ap-
pellate Body Report].
247 See WTO Appellate Body Report, Japan - Measures Affecting Agricultural
Products, WT/DS76/AB/R, (Feb. 22, 1999), available at www.wto.org/english/
tratop e/dispue/ab_reports-e.htm [hereinafter Agricultural Products Appellate
Body Report].
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sues were litigated in all three cases, thus there is a body of
case law interpreting the SPS Agreement. In all three cases, the
importing country lost, and its measures were found to be not in
compliance with WTO rules. Broadly speaking, lack of a proper
risk assessment in each case was found. 248 The measures taken
were also not based on the risk assessment that was
performed.249
1. Application of SPS Agreement
A threshold issue is whether the SPS Agreement applies to
labeling regulations intended primarily for consumer informa-
tion purposes. Article 1.1 of the SPS Agreement states that it
applies to "all sanitary and phytosanitary measures which may,
directly or indirectly, affect international trade. ''250 Sanitary
and phytosanitary measures are defined in Annex A of the SPS
Agreement. They include any measure applied:
1. to protect animal or plant life or health . . . from risks arising
from the entry, establishment or spread of pests, diseases, dis-
ease-carrying organisms or disease-causing organisms;
2. to protect human or animal life or health.., from risks arising
from additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-causing orga-
nisms in foods, beverages or feedstuffs;
3. to protect human life or health.., from risks arising from dis-
eases carried by animals, plants or products thereof, or from the
entry, establishment or spread of pests; or
4. to prevent or limit other damage ... from the entry, establish-
ment or spread of pests. 25 1
The SPS Agreement is thus intended to regulate measures that
limit the importation of disease and pests and their spread, and
to protect against risks arising from contaminants, additives,
and the like. The Annex defines "contaminants" to include pes-
ticide and veterinary drug residues and extraneous matter.252
248 See Hormones Appellate Body Report, supra note 245, para. 6; Salmon Ap-
pellate Body Report, supra note 246, para. 279(d); Agricultural Products Appellate
Body Report, supra note 247, para. 143(f).
249 See Hormones Appellate Body Report, supra note 245, para. 6; Salmon Ap-
pellate Body Report, supra note 246, paras. 135-36; Agricultural Products Appel-
late Body Report, supra note 247, paras. 113-14.
250 SPS Agreement, supra note 90, art. 1.1.
251 Id. Annex A.
252 Id. art. 1 n.4.
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The first question is whether the labeling regulations discussed
above include such measures and therefore fall under the SPS
Agreement.
Those countries whose labeling regulations are described
above generally regulate GMF in two different ways. The first is
an approval process governing the import, marketing and re-
search of GMO and GMF, which requires a risk assessment by
the importing country to determine if they are safe. The second
is a separate regulation requiring labeling of GMF once they are
approved for import or commercialization. Switzerland, the EU,
Australia/New Zealand and Korea all have separate require-
ments for approval and for labeling. Japan has a food inspection
regulation to determine GMO status, and a separate labeling
regulation. In analyzing whether labeling regulations fall under
the SPS Agreement, it is necessary to distinguish them from the
accompanying rules regarding GMO or GMF approval.
The approval processes described in the regulations above
are all based on "science" or a risk assessment, presumably to
conform to the WTO rules as outlined in the Hormones, Salmon,
and Agricultural Products cases. The labeling rules, on the
other hand, do not appear to be safety- or science-based, and
their purpose apparently is to allow consumer choice, and to
provide consumer information, health information, or informa-
tion to those with religious or ethical concerns.
2. Approval Process
Proceeding from the definition provided in Annex A, it is
open to discussion whether the approval regulations fall under
the SPS Agreement. 253 The regulating countries do not appear
to be regulating because they consider GMO a pest, disease or
disease-causing organism. The approval regulations are thus
not caught by definition 1, 2, or 4. Nor do labeling countries ap-
pear to consider GMO a contaminant, toxin, disease-causing or-
ganism or additive, and they are thus most likely not caught by
definition 3. Transgenic products are sui generis, which may be
either a curse or a blessing, in terms of litigation before the
WTO. They are new and different, and are not included in the
253 See Charnovitz, supra note 239, at 276-77 (in agreement, stating that dan-
gers from bio-engineered foods are not covered by the SPS Agreement because ge-
netic modification is not listed in the above categories).
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traditional categories of dangers regulated under the WTO
rules. In the multilateral standard-setting bodies, GMO and
GMF are also not being discussed in terms of contaminants, etc.
It would be difficult for producing countries to argue that GMO
and GMF fall under these categories, as they claim that GMF
are equivalent to traditional foods and completely safe. It is dif-
ficult to picture how the complaint would be framed if a viola-
tion of the SPS Agreement is claimed. According to at least one
commentator, if the measure is not intended to protect against
one of the named risks, then the measure is not an SPS
measure.
2 54
The most likely definition of GMO would be as an additive
if a Panel wanted to view the definitions expansively. 255 Ap-
proval to sell, import or research could be refused under the reg-
ulations outlined, and a challenge of this decision brought
before the WTO. Assuming arguendo that the regulations re-
quiring approval to import or market GMO and GMF are cov-
ered by the SPS Agreement, this does not necessarily mean that
the labeling regulations which accompany them are also subject
to the terms of the SPS Agreement.
3. GATT Regulations
If there is a gap in the SPS Agreement, a complaining coun-
try could still fall back on the GATT provisions. SPS case law
indicates that such an approach is possible, and commentators
have also addressed the GMF issue in terms of GATT require-
ments. The GATT provisions strive for equal treatment of im-
ported goods through application of non-discrimination
principles. 25 6 There are two aspects to these: (1) non-discrimi-
nation by an importing country among importers; and (2) non-
discrimination between imported goods and domestic like-prod-
ucts. 25 7 A violation of either of these rules may provide the ex-
porting country with a legitimate complaint under GATT
254 See Kennedy, supra note 87, at 84; John Stephen Fredland, Note, Unlabel
Their Frankenstein Foods!: Evaluating a U.S. Challenge to the European Commis-
sion's Labeling Requirements for Food Products Containing Genetically-Modified
Organisms, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 183, 212 (2000) (reaching a similar
conclusion).
255 See Bentley, supra note 241, at 127.
256 Id. at 81-82.
257 Id.
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rules. 258 The question would then arise whether the approval
provisions discussed above are discriminating between "like"
products or among importers. At least two commentators argue
that in the case of GMF, there would be no discrimination, since
a proper reading of GATT Article III (4) makes clear that GMF
and traditional foods are not "like."259 The argument is that the
genetic modification creates a completely new product, which is
correctly distinguished from the traditional product. 260
There is also a health and safety exception to the GATT
non-discrimination rules. Article XX provides a list of excep-
tions. In the case of the approval process for GMF, the import-
ing country would most likely rely on GATT Article XX(b), the
health and safety exception that was the forerunner of the SPS
Agreement. The Article XX exception states:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in
a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjusti-
fiable discrimination between countries where the same condi-
tions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade,
nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adop-
tion or enforcement by any contracting party of measures: b) nec-
essary to protect human, animal or plant life or health . .261
The requirements for imposing the Article XX(b) exception are
that it be "necessary," not discriminate arbitrarily, and not be a
disguised restriction on international trade. 262 In order for a
measure to be considered "necessary" it must be the least trade
restrictive alternative available. 263 The question to be resolved
would be whether the approval processes outlined above consti-
tute unnecessary or discriminatory measures, or a disguised
barrier to trade.
The arguments could conceivably take a number of differ-
ent tacks. Many of the approval processes are modeled on the
procedures required under the Protocol. It is open to question
whether measures which comply with a multi-national environ-
258 See Kennedy, supra note 87, at 82.
259 See Howse & Mavroidis, supra note 240, at 319-20; Gaston & Abate, supra
note 27, at 143.
260 See Gaston & Abate, supra note 27, at 143.
261 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. XX(b), 61
Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
262 See Kennedy, supra note 87, at 82.
263 Id.
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mental treaty can be considered discriminatory, even against a
country which is not a party to it. Regarded in this light, they
would not be considered unilateral measures, which has been
important to the GATT panels in the past.264 The approval
processes are designed to be rules and science based, which
should eliminate the argument that they are discriminatory.
265
Certain commentators argue that such measures would be con-
sidered merely the operational requirements of a non-protec-
tionist scheme for health regulation, and that there is no
element of discrimination between domestic products and im-
ports. 266 All GMF are regulated the same. Opponents of the ap-
proval requirements will certainly argue that since there is
little or no domestic production of GMF in the regulating coun-
tries, the measures are clearly a disguised barrier to trade. By
regulating only GMF, the importing countries are giving an un-
fair advantage to traditional domestic production.
The GATT practice has traditionally been to construe Arti-
cle XX narrowly in favor of trade and against non-tariff barriers
to trade. 267 Crucial issues will be whether the approval
processes are considered discriminatory and whether the GMF
are considered "like" traditional counterparts. It is thus possible
that the approval measures could fail a challenge under GATT
Article XX, but on balance, the approval processes should with-
stand the challenge.
4. Labeling Requirements
The labeling requirements which are the focus of this paper
must be analyzed separately from the approval processes. None
of the labeling regulations described are intended to prevent the
introduction or spread of pests, diseases, etc. Nor are they in-
tended to regulate or prevent the presence of contaminants, tox-
264 See, e.g., WTO Appellate Body Report on U.S. Import Prohibitions of Cer-
tain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998), available at
http://www.wto.org (WTO case involving U.S. restrictions on shrimp imports de-
signed to protect endangered sea turtles from accidental harvesting. The WTO Ap-
pellate Body determined that the United States had the right under the WTO to
regulate the conditions of shrimp harvesting in foreign waters, but ruled that the
regulations adopted by the Department of Commerce constituted an impermissibly
arbitrary and discriminatory exercise of that regulatory power).
265 See Kennedy, supra note 87, at 83.
266 See Howse & Mavroidis, supra note 240, at 320.
267 See Kennedy, supra note 87, at 82.
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ins, additives or disease-causing organisms. Unlike the
Hormones, Salmon, and Agricultural Products cases, which
cited specific dangers the measures in question sought to
avert,268 the regulations discussed above make no mention of
any of these specifically. There is a common provision in each
regulation that once the GMF is approved for sale or production
within the country, it is presumed safe. Labeling is a separate
issue done for different reasons.
The Swiss regulation is intended to prevent deceptive prac-
tices.269 The purpose of the South Korean regulation is to pro-
vide information to consumers. 270 The only regulation with an
overt reference to safety is the EU,271 which requires a label if
the novel food contains material not present in an equivalent
food, and which may have health implications for certain sec-
tors of the population.27 2 This presumably refers to the al-
lergenicity issue. The EU also states that its legislation is
intended to prevent consumers from being misled. 273
Based on the definition of sanitary measures in Annex A to
the SPS, and the specific terms of the labeling regulations con-
sidered, it is doubtful that the SPS Agreement would apply to
the labeling regimes proposed. The measures covered by the
SPS Agreement are those intended specifically to combat dis-
ease, pests and the like, and to regulate toxins, additives, and
contaminants.2 7 4 The labeling provisions proposed do not ad-
dress these issues, and are intended to serve a different pur-
pose. The labeling provisions considered alone are not subject to
the SPS Agreement, and also do not appear to be covered under
the Article XX(b) exception of the GATT discussed above. 275
268 See Hormones Appellate Body Report, supra note 245, paras. 1-8; Salmon
Appellate Body Report, supra note 246, paras. 1-5; Agricultural Products Appellate
Body Report, supra note 247, paras. 1-5.
269 See Perrez, supra note 159, at 597.
270 See James Lim, South Korea Finalizes Guidelines for Labeling GMOs Start-
ing Next Year, 17 INT'L TRADE REPORTER 8, 710 (May 4, 2000).
271 See generally Council Directive 90/220/EEC of 23 April 1990 on the Deliber-
ate Release Into the Environment of Genetically Modified Organisms, 1990 O.J. (L
117) 15 (making labeling compulsory for all new products containing or consisting
of genetically modified organisms).
272 Id.
273 See Novel Foods Regulation, supra note 169, art. 3.
274 See SPS Agreement, supra note 90, Annex A.1.
275 See Kennedy, supra note 87, at 84 ("If a measure is not intended to protect
against one of these risks, then the measure is not an SPS measure").
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This then raises the issue of whether the labeling regulations
would be regulated under the TBT Agreement.
C. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
To date, there have been no cases brought before the WTO
under the TBT Agreement, which leaves a number of open ques-
tions as to its potential interpretation.2 7 6 Not only has the TBT
Agreement itself not yet been the subject of interpretation, its
precursor, the Tokyo Round Agreement on Technical Barriers
to Trade, was also never the subject of a ruling by a panel. 277
There is thus little indication how some of the more important
provisions might be interpreted. The only case linked to the
TBT Agreement is the Asbestos case, which was ultimately not
decided on the basis of the TBT Agreement, but rather on GATT
Article 111(4) (discussed above).27 8 However, comments by the
Appellate Body in Asbestos give some insight into factors they
might consider important in the future.
1. Application of TBT Agreement
The TBT Agreement applies to both industrial and agricul-
tural products.27 9 It covers technical rules related to product
characteristics, processes, production methods, packaging, and
labeling. 280 The TBT Agreement is intended to prevent such
technical regulations from being a disguised barrier to trade.
28
'
Legitimate objectives to be achieved by technical regulations
are listed in Article 2.2. These include: "protection of national
security, prevention of deceptive practices, protection of human
health or safety, animal or plant life or health, or the environ-
ment."2 2 This is not a closed list, and other legitimate objec-
tives are possible. 2 3 While health and safety are mentioned,
276 See WTt) Appellate Body Report on European Communities - Measures
Affecting Asbestos And Asbestos-Containing Products, WTIDS135/AB/R, para. 81,
(Mar. 12, 2001), 40 I.L.M. 1193 (2001) [hereinafter Asbestos Appellate Body
Report].
277 Id.
278 Id. paras. 192-93.
279 See TBT Agreement, supra note 95, art. 1.3.
280 Id. Annex 1.
281 Id. pmbl.
282 Id. art. 2.2.
283 Id. (The objectives are listed as "inter alia," which implies that others are
possible).
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they are not the main focus of the TBT Agreement. 28 4 If the
measures are designed solely to protect health and safety, then
the SPS Agreement is the proper rule. 28 5 A regulation is defined
in Annex 1.1 as a
document which lays down product characteristics or their re-
lated processes and production methods, . . . with which compli-
ance is mandatory. It may also include or deal exclusively with
terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labeling require-
ments as they apply to a product, process or production
method.28 6
The labeling regimes in question are mandatory, and they apply
to both the product characteristics and to the production
method of the GMF in question.2 7
From a textual standpoint, the TBT Agreement covers
mandatory labeling requirements. They would be considered a
technical regulation under the definition provided in Annex 1,
Article 1. From the apparent intent of the various labeling
framers as well, they should be considered technical
regulations.
2. Legal Requirements
To conform with the TBT Agreement, a regulation must
meet six legal criteria. First, imported products must be treated
no less favorably than "like" domestic products, and "like" prod-
ucts from other countries. 288 Second, regulations must be no
more trade restrictive than necessary to achieve their objec-
tives.28 9 Third, the regulations must be based on international
standards, to the extent they exist or are imminent, unless they
would not permit the achievement of the objectives sought. 290 If
there is no standard, or the technical regulation in place dero-
gates from it, there is a requirement to notify otler members
284 Id.
285 SPS Agreement, supra note 90, art. 1.1 ("This agreement applies to all sani-
tary and phytosanitary measures which may, directly or indirectly, affect interna-
tional trade"); see also id. Annex A, which defines in more detail SPS measures.
286 See TBT Agreement, supra note 95, Annex 1.1.
287 Id.
288 Id. art. 2.1.
289 Id. art. 2.2.
290 Id. art. 2.4.
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what the regulation requires.291 Fourth, with a view to harmo-
nizing measures, countries must recognize other members' mea-
sures as technically equivalent, if those measures meet the
stated objectives. 292 Fifth, members shall ensure that all techni-
cal regulations adopted are promptly published. 293 Sixth, mem-
bers are responsible for ensuring that all subsidiary
governments conform to the TBT Agreement if they also set
technical regulations. 294 In addition, members are responsible
for ensuring that their government standard-setting bodies ad-
here to the Code of Good Practice for the Preparation, Adoption
and Application of Standards. 295 Of these, only the first three
are likely to be the object of dispute if a case is brought before
the WTO. The remaining three are more housekeeping mea-
sures, and should not be cause for conflict.
3. Application to Labeling Schemes
The next point is consideration of the labeling rules dis-
cussed above, with regard to whether they meet the legal re-
quirements of the TBT Agreement. In case of challenge, on
what basis could they be overturned?
4. Are They "Like"?
"Likeness" of products will doubtless be one of the most dif-
ficult points argued. What is "like"? Is it substantial equiva-
lence, or something else? There is no Panel or Appellate Body
decision interpreting "likeness" under the TBT Agreement.
However, "likeness" is a term that is used throughout the
GATT, and the Appellate Body in Asbestos was at pains to dis-
cuss the concept of "likeness" in detail.296 As the Panel hearing
Asbestos declined to consider Canada's claims under the TBT
Agreement, and made no findings of fact, the Appellate Body
was unable to rule on potential violations of the TBT Agree-
ment. 297 Although the Appellate Body did not consider "like-
ness" in the context of the TBT Agreement, the Appellate Body
291 Id. arts. 2.9 - 2.9.4.
292 TBT Agreement, supra note 95, art. 2.7.
293 Id. art. 2.11.
294 Id. art. 3.
295 Id. art. 4, Annex 3.
296 See Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 276, paras. 85-92.
297 Id. paras. 81, 82.
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did outline the criteria which it, and other panels, have used in
determining whether products are "like."298
The Appellate Body began by determining that "likeness"
has no specific definition, but must be determined through a
case-by-case consideration of the provision which requires "like-
ness" and the circumstances which surround it.299 "Likeness" is
a flexible word, and expands and shrinks like an accordion de-
pending on the context. 300 The Appellate Body rejected the ordi-
nary (dictionary) meaning of "like," since it does not resolve
three issues of interpretation: (1) which qualities or characteris-
tics are important in assessing "likeness"; (2) the degree or ex-
tent to which products must share qualities or characteristics in
order to be "like"; and (3) from whose perspective "likeness" is
determined.301
The Appellate Body then noted an approach for analyzing
"likeness" that was developed in the context of GATT, and sub-
sequently followed and developed by several panels and the Ap-
pellate Body.30 2 The approved approach uses four general
criteria in analyzing "likeness": (1) the properties, nature, and
quality of the products; (2) the end-uses of the products; (3) con-
sumer's tastes and habits in respect of the products; and (4) the
tariff classification of the products. 30 3 The Appellate Body elab-
orated on these categories, explaining that properties refers to
physical properties, and that consumers' tastes means the ex-
tent to which consumers perceive and treat the products as al-
ternative means of performing particular functions to satisfy a
demand. 30 4 These criteria are interrelated. 30 5 The Appellate
Body stressed that this is not the only means to approach "like-
ness," nor a closed list of considerations. 306 Nevertheless, it is
apparently an approach accepted by many Panels and Appellate
Bodies. 30 7 In the context of the Asbestos case, the Appellate
298 Id. para. 85.
299 Id. para. 88.
300 Id. para. 88 n.59.
301 Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 276, para. 92.
302 Id. para. 104.
303 Id. para. 85.
304 Id. para. 101.
305 Id. para. 102.
306 Id.
307 Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 276, paras. 101, 102.
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Body paid particular attention to the chemical composition of
the products involved, which differed significantly, and to their
differing levels of carcinogenicity. 308 This might give insight
into how a Panel or Appellate body would view the underlying
characteristics of GMF.
Whether GMF have similar physical properties to tradi-
tional foods of the same type will likely be vigorously disputed.
It will be argued that the mere fact that there are proteins from
foreign genes makes their physical characteristics very differ-
ent. Indeed, the very reason they are bio-engineered is to have
different physical characteristics. The fact that they are often
patented also indicates that they are not "like" ordinary food of
the same type, or they would not be unique enough to qualify
for patent protection. The potential allergens and toxic ele-
ments they contain also indicates that their physical properties
are not "like" traditional foods. Particularly, second generation
GMF, which involve multiple gene transplants, are far removed
from traditional counterparts.
The counter-argument will be that GMF are substantially
equivalent to traditional foods of the same type. They have al-
most all of the same characteristics, indeed all of the key char-
acteristics, and are simply enhanced. This is the position of the
FDA in the United States, and the reason they are freely mar-
keted there.30 9 The TBT Agreement also requires that where
possible, technical regulations should be based on product re-
quirements in terms of performance, not characteristics. 310 The
resolution of this will be a question of fact for the Panel.
Discussion of and resolution of whether substantial equiva-
lence of GMF is accepted as the standard in Codex is an impor-
tant consideration here. If substantial equivalence becomes the
standard, then the "like" issue could be resolved against label-
ing countries. This highlights once again the importance of the
Codex rules, and the intensity with which countries on different
sides of this debate will attempt to influence the discussions in
Codex.
308 Id. para. 114.
309 See Emily Robertson, Finding a Compromise in the Debate Over Genetically
Modified Food: An Introduction to a Model State Consumer Right-to-Know Act, 9
B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 156, 159 (2003).
310 See TBT Agreement, supra note 95, art. 2.8.
45
PACE INT'L L. REV.
In regard to the second criteria, GMF are put to the same
end-uses as traditional counterparts. There should be no dis-
pute about this.
The third criteria, consumer perception, will also likely be a
sticking point. The growing consumer demand worldwide for la-
beling indicates quite clearly that consumers do not perceive
GMF and traditional counterparts as the same, and do not per-
ceive GMF as an acceptable alternative to traditional food. 311 At
the least, consumers wish to be able to distinguish between the
two before making a purchasing decision. The counter-argu-
ment is that this is based on irrational fears and has nothing to
do with the reality of the science behind GM products. The rules
are not provided for consumers to make irrational decisions.
Consumer perceptions need not be based in science, nor does
there appear to be a rational basis criteria for consumer percep-
tions. In the Asbestos case, the Appellate Body did look at how
consumers viewed the two products, at least from a relative
safety standpoint, and noted that ultimate consumers may have
a different view of a product's "likeness" than the inventor or
producers of the product. 312
The last criteria, tariff classification, does not appear likely
to be disputed.
On balance, relying on criteria number one and three, a
panel could justifiably find that GMF and traditional counter-
parts are not "like." If they are not "like," a claim under the TBT
Agreement should fail. However, if other criteria are used, or
these criteria are interpreted differently, and a finding of "like-
ness" is made, the question then becomes whether the regula-
tion discriminates against "like" products.
5. Are Genetically Modified Foods Discriminated Against?
TBT Article 2.1 requires that "like" products be treated no
less favorably than products of national origin, or like products
originating from another country. 313 As discussed above,
311 Some chemical companies are recognizing this and are supporting volun-
tary labeling guidelines, to protect markets and soothe consumer fears. See, e.g.,
Dilemma - Food Labeling, Monsanto, at http://www.monsanto.com/monsanto/lay-
out/our-pledge/dialogue/foodlabeling.asp (last visited Oct. 25, 2003); see also As-
bestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 276, para. 102.
312 See GATT, supra note 261, para. 92.
313 See Asbestos Appellate Body Report, supra note 276, para. 87.
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whether GMF will be considered "like" is open to doubt, based
on both the physical characteristics and consumer perception
criteria. However, the TBT also applies a non-discrimination
test.
The labeling rules discussed above describe a uniform pol-
icy regarding all GMF, both domestic and imported. No distinc-
tion is made between imported GMF and domestic GMF, to the
extent GMF is grown or produced domestically. For most of the
regulatory schemes, the sole criteria which triggers labeling is
the percentage threshold.
The labeling rules do treat GMF differently from tradi-
tional counterparts, by requiring labels on GMO status. The
question is whether this is discrimination under the terms of
the TBT Agreement. If a country requires only "GMF" labels, is
it more discriminatory than if they allow both "GMF" and
"GMO-free" labels on all food, because they are singling out only
GMF? Under this analysis, the Swiss and the Japanese regula-
tions would not be discriminatory. Under the EU rules, as well,
GMO-free labels are acceptable but apparently not required. It
has long been accepted practice under GATT rules that coun-
tries can require labeling of country of origin on food and other
products.314 Labels providing information about the environ-
mentally friendly practices of the producer are permitted.315 So
are labels with information provided for religious purposes,
such as kosher for observant Jews, hallal for devout Muslims or
vegetarian for Hindus. If these are acceptable, an argument
could be made that labels as to GMO status are also acceptable.
There is as yet no WTO panel interpretation of "treatment
no less favorable," as defined in GATT Article 111(4) solely in the
context of the TBT. The GATT and WTO Panels and Appellate
Bodies have discussed this requirement in the context of GATT
Article III. While the text of the TBT Agreement appears to fo-
cus solely on the issue of protection of domestic product against
314 See GATT, supra note 261, art. IX.
315 See, e.g., FAQ, StarKist, at http://www.starkist.com/ (stating that StarKist
will not purchase any tuna caught in association with dolphins or caught with
devices, which are known to be dangerous to many forms of marine life, and that
StarKist tuna is labeled with a special "Dolphin Safe" logo); Fishing For Answers,
Bumble Bee, at http://www.bumblebee.com/faq.jsp (stating that all of Bumble
Bee's tuna products are certifiably dolphin-safe, indicated by the "dolphin-safe"
symbol).
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imported competition, it is likely that a WTO Panel would inter-
pret this requirement along the same lines as GATT Panels
have done in the past. The requirements have traditionally
been interpreted narrowly, in favor of trade and against non-
tariff barriers. 316 The counter-argument is likely to be that
since the regulating countries have little to no domestic produc-
tion of GMF, the labels are a disguised barrier to trade, imple-
mented to protect importing countries' domestic agriculture and
products. It is thus possible that the labeling requirements
could fail under this analysis. Only if the regulating countries
can convince a panel that there is no discriminatory effect could
the labeling requirements pass this hurdle.
6. Least Restrictive Trade Measures
The technical rules put in place must be the least trade re-
strictive possible to achieve the desired objective. 317 The stated
objective of most of the regulations examined is to provide con-
sumers with information about the food they buy and eat and,
(for some countries) to provide safety and/or ethical informa-
tion. By definition, labeling is the most likely means to provide
such information to consumers; an alternative does not come to
mind. If the TBT Agreement is interpreted similarly to the SPS
Agreement, the burden of proof is on the complaining party to
establish that there is another, less restrictive measure
possible. 318
Even if a label is the least restrictive measure, another
question arises. How much information is required on a label?
At what point is there too much information, and how much in-
formation do consumers really need to have? Would it be ade-
quate merely to put the country of origin on the label, or would
this harm those exporters who are GM free as well as those who
are not? One argument made in favor of labels is that once con-
sumers get accustomed to eating GM foods, their confidence in
the products will grow; they would thus be a benefit to the GM
industry. That some biotech companies are beginning to volun-
tarily label their products indicates they see the wisdom of this
316 See Kennedy, supra note 87, at 82.
317 See TBT Agreement, supra note 95, art. 2.2.
318 See Kennedy, supra note 87, at 87.
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point.319 Others ask whether such labels are not akin to a warn-
ing symbol on the product. 320
The labeling requirement in many countries replaces a
complete ban on GMO and GMF 321 and for others will provide
for increased marketing of GM products. 322 Labeling could
therefore be viewed as a measure promoting trade in GM prod-
ucts. It is unlikely a complaining party would succeed if chal-
lenging this provision.
D. Conformance to International Standards
The lack of labeling rules from Codex has already been dis-
cussed. Rules from Codex can hardly be said to be "imminent,"
since Codex only meets every two years. In the absence of inter-
national standards, members are forced to set their own stan-
dards. However, the SPS case law has shown that there are
risks to this approach.
The labeling requirements studied vary in their approach.
The Protocol requires the label "may contain GMO" for food or
feed which is processed. 323 South Korea has implemented this
standard. In the context of the TBT Agreement, the question
also arises whether adherence to the Cartagena Protocol rules
would qualify a country for the presumption of compliance dis-
cussed in TBT Article 2.4. As discussed above, the short answer
is "most likely not." However, at least one commentator has ar-
gued that despite the savings clause, under a narrow interpre-
tation the Protocol could prevail, 324 while others have also
noted the necessity for clarifying the intersection of the WTO
and multi-lateral environmental agreements. 325
Many of the other labeling countries have gone beyond the
Protocol standard in the level of detail they demand and the
threshold imposed. TBT Article 2.4 allows members to derogate
from international standards if they would be inappropriate or
319 See e.g., Dilemma - Food Labeling, supra note 311.
320 See Kennedy, supra note 87, at 81.
321 See discussion supra Part II.
322 See Id.
323 Protocol, supra note 55, art. 18.
324 See Gaston & Abate, supra note 27, at 120-22 (discussing Vienna Conven-
tion interpretation of the two treaties).
325 See Kennedy, supra note 87, at 103.
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ineffective in fulfilling the member's legitimate objectives. 326
Thus a country appears to be free to set a higher threshold than
that required by international standards if necessary. Under
what standard a Panel would interpret such a threshold is an-
other open question under the TBT agreement, and underscores
yet again the importance of leveraging the Codex standard-set-
ting process to achieve a workable standard.
E. Summary
The TBT Agreement probably does apply. There is a textual
argument to be made for its application. Labels are specifically
mentioned as a technical regulation, and other labels are regu-
lated here (nutrition, national origin, etc...), although there is
no specific provision in the TBT for consumer rights. However,
the list of objectives cited is not a closed list. There is an as-
sumption by some opponents that the TBT Agreement applies.
Issues likely to be litigated are discrimination of "like" products
and international standards. There are also fundamental dis-
putes about the extent of consumers' right to know. While the
labeling regimes are declared to be for the benefit of consumers,
labeling opponents argue that their purpose is merely to serve
as a non-tariff barrier.
It is doubtful that opponents of labeling could prevail on
the issue of "likeness," an issue which could prove to be decisive.
Labels are more likely to be viewed as a non-tariff barrier, at
least under the GATT jurisprudence to date. The lack of inter-
national standards makes it even more difficult to predict the
outcome. The labeling rules as they are written appear designed
to comply with the TBT Agreement, and on balance, should
withstand a challenge.
IV. CONCLUSION
The issue of labeling GMF is politically divisive and likely
to lead to trade frictions between countries which produce and
export GMF and those importing countries which are attempt-
ing to restrict GMF. A potential dispute before the WTO looms.
While often framed in terms of a conflict solely between the
United States and the EU, in fact labeling regimes are in place
326 Id. at 86.
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in many other countries, and thus the scope of a potential con-
flict extends beyond a trans-Atlantic dispute. Consumers from
many countries, including an increasing number in GMF-pro-
ducing countries, are requiring more information about
whether the food they eat contains GMF.
Which WTO rules would apply to such a dispute is uncer-
tain, although either the SPS Agreement or the TBT Agreement
would be implicated. The labeling rules examined in this paper
appear to have been drafted to take account of the WTO case
law to date, and to comply with multinational environmental
treaties on GMF. The labeling schemes would likely not fall
under the SPS Agreement, as at least facially, the rules are not
designed to deal with health or safety-related issues. The TBT
Agreement has never been applied in a WTO dispute situation,
so many questions about its interpretation and application
must remain open. A country disputing the validity of labeling
regulations would challenge most successfully on grounds that
they are a disguised barrier to trade. Based on prior GATT ju-
risprudence, however, and dicta from other cases, a country
bringing a complaint against a labeling scheme could find a
heavy burden of proof. The best defense for countries imple-
menting labeling will be the issue of whether GMF are consid-
ered "like" traditional counterparts. Resolution of this question
will turn largely on questions of fact and science presented to
the Panel adjudicating. Physical properties and the underlying
makeup of the product are likely to be significant. In addition,
indications in the prior case law are that the WTO is inclined to
give at least some weight to consumer views in regard to "like-
ness." This may well prove to be a critical factor, as the avowed
purpose of the labeling rules is to provide consumers with the
information they need to make an informed choice about the
food they purchase.
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